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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM

The Situation in Vietnam

ARMY review(s) completed.

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26 July 1967

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Information as of 1600
26 July 1967

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HIGHLIGHTS

Ground fighting in South Vietnam remained relatively light on 25 July.

I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:

Ground fighting remained relatively light on 25 July (Para. 1). Two recent enemy attempts to infiltrate weapons and ammunition into southern I Corps, despite the high risk involved, suggest that Viet Cong forces in the area may be unusually short of combat supplies (Paras. 2-4). North Vietnamese Army replacements continue to be infiltrated to such priority areas as the Demilitarized Zone, the Northern Front, and the western highlands (Paras. 5-11). The Weekly Review of South Vietnam Battle Statistics (Para. 12).

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III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
There is nothing of significance to report.

IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.

V. Communist Political Developments: There is nothing of significance to report.

ANNEX:

South Vietnam Battle Statistics
1963 to week of 16-22 July 1967
-Weapons and Personnel Losses
-Viet Cong Attacks and Incidents



I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Ground fighting remained relatively light on 25 July. The most significant action occurred approximately 17 miles northwest of Hue, where South Vietnamese Army troops killed 62 enemy in three separate battles. The South Vietnamese lost one killed and ten wounded.

2. Two abortive enemy attempts in March and July to infiltrate weapons and ammunition by sea into coastal areas of the southern I Corps, despite the high risk involved may indicate that Viet Cong forces in the area are unusually short of combat supplies. The enemy's acknowledgement of the risk involved in these sea operations is evidenced by their rigging the supply trawlers for destruction in the event of capture.

3. The movement of the Viet Cong 48th Local Force Battalion to the Cap Batangan area within two days on both occasions suggests that Quang Ngai Province guerrilla forces are having especially serious supply problems. This has probably been caused by US Army Task Force OREGON's increasing pressure on Viet Cong logistical facilities and base camps in the area. During the past two months paratroopers of the 101st Airborne Brigade, part of Task Force OREGON, have reported killing over 400 Viet Cong in a series of sweeps through Quang Ngai. Just to the north in Quang Tin Province, a recent rallier [redacted]

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[redacted] has stated that his unit had only 50 percent of its normal equipment allowance and was so low on mortar and recoilless rifle ammunition that these weapons could be used only "under emergency conditions." He also stated that his unit disliked coordinated operations with the local Viet Cong because these troops, presumably even more poorly supplied, would not stand and fight.

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4. As allied sweep operations continue in the coming weeks in the coastal areas of southern I Corps and monsoon rains hamper North Vietnamese logistical operations through the Laotian corridor, it is probable that the enemy will continue to attempt resupply of this area by sea.

Infiltration of North Vietnamese Replacements

5. MACV has provided information from interrogations of several North Vietnamese and Viet Cong prisoners and returnees in widely scattered parts of South Vietnam. The interrogations provide some insight into the continuing infiltration of men from North Vietnam and the shifting of Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army forces within South Vietnam.

6. In Quang Tri Province, the interrogation of three detainees from the 808th North Vietnamese Army Battalion, disclosed that the 808th received 60 replacements--all 16 or 17 years old--from a 600-man battalion which arrived in June from North Vietnam to reinforce the Northern Front. This battalion was reportedly from the 42nd Regiment of the 350th Division.

7. The detainees also stated that the 808th Battalion had impressed about 30 untrained South Vietnamese and used them as soldiers after only 20 days of indoctrination. Despite the arrival of replacements as late as June, the 808th Battalion was still believed to be understrength with less than 200 men available for duty.

8. The interrogation of [] from the Viet Cong 1st Regiment of the 2nd Division, North Vietnamese Army, disclosed that his regiment had moved to western Quang Ngai Province. It was to remain there for approximately three months to receive replacement of personnel and weapons. The regiment, which suffered heavy losses during April-June 1967, had only 700 men as of late June. [] also stated that the latest North Vietnamese replacements had arrived in April 1967 and [] battalion--the 60th--had received 180 new men at that time.

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9. In Pleiku Province, [redacted] from the North Vietnamese 32nd Regiment, [redacted] stated that his regiment had received replacements in June from the 1st Battalion of the North Vietnamese 36th Regiment. [redacted] stated that the 1st Battalion had infiltrated into Kontum Province in early 1967 before being reassigned to the 32nd Regiment in Pleiku. MACV believes this unit may have been part of the North Vietnamese 36th Regiment which has been operating in Kontum since August 1966.

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10. Another report on the manpower difficulties the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army forces are encountering comes from [redacted]

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[redacted] the North Vietnamese 21st Regiment in Quang Tin Province [redacted]

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[redacted] stated that his regiment had been reduced by 30 percent by battle casualties since entering South Vietnam in early 1966. He further stated that he knew of no replacements received in 1967 and that the regiment had only 50 percent of its assigned equipment.

11. These few reports--like many others in recent months--suggest that a steady stream of replacements are flowing into Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army units in such priority areas as the Demilitarized Zone, the Northern Front and the western highlands. Enemy units in the coastal provinces of I and II Corps and further south in III Corps, however, are apparently having to do the best they can. Usually this has meant increased local recruiting, the shifting of irregular forces to Main Force units and in some instances the disbanding or reshuffling of existing Main Force units.

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Weekly Review of South Vietnam Battle Statistics

12. The week of 16-22 July compared with the week of 9-15 July.

I. Viet Cong Incidents

	<u>9-15 July</u>	<u>16-22 July</u>
Attacks	55	48
Battalion or larger.....	2	3
Small Unit.....	53	45
Harassment	376	338
Terrorism	46	36
Sabotage	21	52
Propaganda	12	20
Antiaircraft	<u>280</u>	<u>174</u>
TOTAL INCIDENTS	790	668

II. Casualties

	<u>VC/NVA</u>		<u>GVN</u>	
	<u>9-15 July</u>	<u>16-22 July</u>	<u>9-15 July</u>	<u>16-22 July</u>
Killed	1,877	1,702	202	175
Wounded	-----	-----	543	499
Missing/ Captured	-----	-----	<u>34</u>	<u>33</u>
TOTALS	1,877	1,702	779	707

	<u>US</u>		<u>FREE WORLD</u>	
	<u>9-15 July</u>	<u>16-22 July</u>	<u>9-15 July</u>	<u>16-22 July</u>
Killed	175	164	25	16
Wounded	1,443	1,442	46	34
Missing/ Captured	-----	-----	--	<u>1</u>
TOTALS	1,618	1,606	71	51

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III. Weapons Captured

	<u>VC/NVA</u>		<u>GVN</u>	
	<u>9-15 July</u>	<u>16-22 July</u>	<u>9-15 July</u>	<u>16-22 July</u>
Individual	430	Not	114	143
Crew-Served	<u>76</u>	Reported	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>
TOTALS	506		117	147

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

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

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Weapons Losses



Personnel Losses (Killed only)*



US Casualties to Date: Killed 12,166 Wounded 72,982 Captured 191 Missing 522

*Due to a change in the reporting of personnel losses, beginning 12 February 1967, the weekly and monthly figure will represent only personnel killed.

